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Barba’s (2012) article deftly weaves
three main themes in one argument
about operant variability. From gen-
eral theoretical considerations on
operant behavior (Catania, 1973),
Barba derives methodological guide-
lines about response differentiation
and applies them to the study of
operant variability. In the process,
he uncovers unnoticed features of
operant variability research (e.g.,
Neuringer, 2002) and proposes inter-
esting modifications and extensions
of current experimental practices.
Barba’s article calls for renewed
attention to important issues, and
we find merit in his proposal to
evaluate operant variability by com-
paring response distributions along a
common continuous measure. We are
less convinced, however, by the con-
ceptual underpinnings that he brings
to the task.
Differentiation and operant behav-
ior. First consider Barba’s claim that
‘‘differentiation is the behavioral
process that demonstrates an operant
relation’’ (p. 000). There is a sense of
differentiation in which this claim is
trivially true. Operant behavior is
demonstrated by choosing a response
criterion R, delivering some conse-
quence S for any activity that satisfies
R, and noting that the prevalence of
R changes as a result (Skinner, 1938).
By definition of operant reinforce-
ment, the prevalence of criterial
activities (R) must increase during
reinforcement, and the prevalence of
at least another activity (,R) must
decrease because all activities com-
pete for the same total time (Rachlin
& Burkhard, 1978). If these changes
in the relative prevalence of R and
,R are all that we mean by differen-
tiation, then it is obviously true that
reinforcement entails differentiation.
In this case, however, there is no need
to evaluate probability distributions
along a continuous measure (as in
Barba’s Figure 2) to demonstrate an
operant relation. Any evidence that
the prevalence of R increases (or, in
the case of punishment, decreases)
will do, together with control condi-
tions to show that the observed
changes are actually due to the cor-
relation between R and S (Thompson
& Iwata, 2005).
Alternatively, by response differen-
tiation we may mean something more
than the changes of response distri-
bution that are a logical consequence
of the definition of reinforcement.
Here is how Galbicka (1988) charac-
terizes response differentiation:
Skinner’s analysis of response differentiation
in The Behavior of Organisms invoked three
processes: reinforcement, extinction, and in-
duction (generalization). Reinforcement in-
creased the likelihood that a response, with
its associated constellation of characteristics,
would be repeated. Through induction, similar
responses occurred even though never directly
reinforced. … At some point, induction
generated a response value outside the rein-
forced class. The effect of extinction was to
decrease the rate of responses with these
characteristics, and also to decrease (through
induction) the rate of similar responses. The
key to differentiation was that the direct effect
of reinforcement or extinction was always
considered greater than the indirect effect of
induction. Hence, the two classes drew apart in
frequency, as criterional responses continued
directly to be reinforced and noncriterional
ones continued to be extinguished. (p. 344)
In Galbicka’s analysis, response differ-
entiation involves operant reinforcement
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as well as processes of response
induction and extinction. Notice that
to speak of extinction as a process (as
opposed to extinction as a proce-
dure), it is not enough to point out
that during operant reinforcement
noncriterial responses are not fol-
lowed by S (which is of course true
in any reinforcement situation). Rath-
er, the prevalence of at least some
noncriterial responses (,R) must
actually decrease as a result of not
being followed by S. It is extinction in
this functional sense that produces a
gradual sharpening of response dis-
tributions when the reinforcement
criterion is held constant, and their
gradual displacement when the crite-
rion is increased or decreased across
sessions (Skinner, 1938, Chapter 8).
Ultimately it is the combined effect of
reinforcement, induction, and extinc-
tion that allows ‘‘the distribution of
emitted responses … to conform
closely [italics added] to the bounda-
ries of the class of reinforced respons-
es’’ (Catania, 1998, p. 117).
On this alternative conception of
differentiation, however, it is no
longer true that ‘‘differentiation is
the behavioral process that demon-
strates an operant relation.’’ The
behavioral process that demonstrates
an operant relation is reinforcement,
not differentiation, and it is certainly
possible to have the former without
the latter. Consider Skinner’s (1938,
p. 87) demonstration of a prolonged
increase in response rate when lever
pressing (R) was followed by a single
food delivery (S) and then recorded
in extinction. Here no differentiation
was possible because after reinforcing
only one variant of R (the other
variants being never emitted, they
were neither reinforced nor extin-
guished) all variants were extin-
guished nondifferentially. Yet the
obvious increase in response rate
was enough to demonstrate operant
reinforcement, and therefore an op-
erant relation, by comparison to a
control condition in which S was
presented independently of R (Skin-
ner, 1938, p. 81).
Even in situations that leave
enough time for response differentia-
tion, the latter will not take place if
for some reason the response variants
being reinforced and extinguished
cannot follow separate courses. Fig-
ure 1, for example, shows the number
of eye blinks per minute in one child
affected by Trisomy 18 (Brownfield
& Keehn, 1966). Frequency of blink-
ing increased in sessions in which the
child was spoonfed after each blink
(filled symbols) and decreased in
control sessions in which the child
was fed independently of blinking
(open symbols). These data are ample
evidence for an operant relation
between blinking and food. Yet we
have no reason to believe that re-
sponse differentiation in the sense of
either Galbicka (1988) or Catania
(1998) ocurred in this particular case.
Although logically possible, differen-
tiation was unlikely given the perva-
siveness of the child’s motor impair-
ments. In organisms that are not
motorically impaired, quantitative
response differentiation can always
fail if the reinforced and extinguished
variants are too close to each other.
Now we do not deny that response
differentiation is almost always pres-
ent alongside operant reinforcement.
The fact remains that reinforcement
and differentiation are logically dis-
tinct and that demonstrating the
latter is not necessary to document
the former, hence to document an
operant relation. What matters is
comparing the levels of prevalence
of the target property (R) under
operant and nonoperant conditions
(see above). Of course, regardless of
the control conditions employed to
study reinforcement, the interpreta-
tion of the results is an exercise in
causal inference (Cartwright, 1981)
and as such remains open to alterna-
tive interpretations (e.g., Gardner &
Gardner, 1988).
Mind the gap. Even though we are
skeptical of Barba’s general conception
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of operant behavior, his methodolog-
ical criticisms of variability studies are
well taken. It is true, for instance, that
in lag n studies of variability the
reinforcement criterion (S distribu-
tion) and the measure of its behav-
ioral effects (the R distribution) differ
from each other. Even though the S
and R criteria may be correlated, the
fact that they differ creates difficulties
in interpreting the results. Admitted-
ly, variability research is not unique in
this respect. In Thorndike’s (1898)
classic studies of cats escaping a
puzzle box, for example, the measure
of reinforcement effects was not
response rate but latency to escape.
In this case, however, the conceptual
gap between the hypothesized rein-
forcement process and its measure-
ment can be filled by assuming that
reinforced activities tend to occur
earlier than the others or that shorter
latencies reflect the progressive ex-
tinction of competing responses
(Skinner, 1969). Whether our hypoth-
eses are correct or not, a set of causal
processes that lead from the S to the
R criterion can be formulated rela-
tively easily.
In the case of operant variability
studies, the gap from S to R distri-
butions is not so easily filled. If the
experimenter specifies Lag 25 as the
reinforcement criterion (i.e., only
sequences of pecks with recurrence
times greater than 25 are reinforced),
but measures its behavioral effects
through the U statistic (itself a func-
tion of the steady-state probability
distribution of all peck sequences),
what processes relate the S to the R
distributions (see Machado, 1992,
1993)? How does a lag-based criteri-
on engender an observed U value?
Several possibilities can be contem-
plated. All scientific theories take
some phenomena as primitive or
axiomatic, and others are derivative
or emergent. In current behavior
analysis, operant reinforcement is
seen as a behavioral primitive, where-
as contrast in multiple schedules, for
example, is taken as the result of
more elementary processes that act
in combination (Williams, 2002). In
other cases such as the matching law,
whether the phenomenon should be
taken as primitive or derivative re-
mains uncertain (Williams, 1990). In
the case at hand, the issue is to know
whether operant variability docu-
ments an instance of operant condi-
tioning similar to the conditioning of
any other activity, or is a result
reducible to more elementary pro-
cesses. Neuringer and Jensen (2012)
clearly favor the former hypothesis:
Variable responding is produced and main-
tained by reinforcers contingent upon it.
Variability does not always decrease with
learning, this being counter to initial theories
of reinforcement. Of most importance, partic-
ular levels of variability are engendered by
reinforcers contingent upon those levels.
Variability is a dimension of behavior analo-
gous to other operant dimensions, such as
response rate, force, and topography. (p. 57)
One difficulty raised by this interpre-
tation is the relation between stereo-
typy and variability. How can vari-
ability be reinforced if reinforcement
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Figure 1. Number of eyeblinks per minute
in one child affected by Trisomy 18. The filled
symbols show response rate in sessions in
which the child was spoonfed after each
eyeblink (contingent condition, C). Empty
symbols show response rate in control sessions
in which food was delivered independently of
blinking (noncontingent condition, NC). Data
from Brownfield and Keehn (1966, Table 1,
p. 414).
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raises the probability of the responses
that produce it, a process that neces-
sarily increases stereotypy? Page and
Neuringer (1985) addressed the issue
with the following argument:
Variability is as susceptible to control by
reinforcement as are frequency, force, dura-
tion, location, or topography. … The follow-
ing analogy may be useful: The pigeon enters
the operant conditioning experiment with a
class of behaviors described as pecking already
intact. When the experimenter shapes key
pecking, the pecking response is not being
trained. Rather, the pigeon is taught where,
when, and possibly how fast or hard, and so
on, to peck. Analogously, there may be a
dimension of all behaviors, described as
variability, with which the organism enters
our experiments. … Turning on or off a
variability generator may be under the control
of reinforcement, but the variability generator
is not itself created through reinforcement. An
animal may be born with the variability
generator intact. (p. 450)
Clarifying the account. Two aspects
of Page and Neuringer’s (1985) ac-
count need to be clarified. First, Page
and Neuringer do not deny that
reinforcement can lead to behavioral
stereotypy. On the contrary, they
presuppose the stereotypy-increasing
effect of reinforcement when dealing
with response dimensions such as
location or force. But if reinforce-
ment can increase stereotypy as well
as variability, under what circum-
stances does reinforcement favor
one over the other? A complicating
factor is that, unlike force or loca-
tion, variability refers always to
another dimension, as Barba points
out. We are dealing not with vari-
ability in the abstract but with
variability of another response prop-
erty such response sequencing. If
variability is a response dimension,
then it is a second-order dimension,
whereas force and duration, for exam-
ple, are first-order dimensions. So the
question becomes: How can the rein-
forcement of a response strengthen
responses with equal values along its
first-order dimensions (and thereby
increase stereotypy) while simulta-
neously strengthening responses with
equal values along a second-order
dimension (and thereby increase vari-
ability)?
Second, if variability depends on
the working of a variability genera-
tor, then what turns the generator
on? Page and Neuringer (1985) an-
swer the question by introducing an
additional hypothesis. The operant
conditioning of behavioral variability
is said to involve a particular type of
discrimination:
It is advantageous for an animal to discrim-
inate situations in which new responses must
be learned from those in which previously
learned behaviors must be repeated. We
hypothesize that this discrimination is based
on the reinforcement of diverse responses and
response classes in the former case versus
reinforcement of fixed, or stereotyped, re-
sponses and response classes in the latter. …
When an animal is differentially rewarded for
a variety of responses, it generates variable
behaviors. (p. 449)
According to this account, then,
reinforcement does not affect behav-
ioral variability by making reinforced
variants more probable. Instead, an-
imals discriminate situations in which
reinforcers follow repetitive behaviors
from situations in which reinforcers
follow novel or diverse behaviors. In
the former case, stereotypy increases.
In the latter case, an inborn variabil-
ity generator is turned on and, as a
consequence, behavioral variability
increases. To explain why variability
is higher under a Lag 25 schedule
than under a Lag 5 schedule, the
account further assumes that when
the variability generator is turned on,
it is attuned to the variability require-
ments imposed by the schedule
(Neuringer, 1986, p. 74). ;
A critique of the account. The
foregoing account of operant vari-
ability faces difficulties. First, like
Barba’s appeal to differentiation as
the basis of operant behavior, Neur-
inger’s (1986) discrimination-based
conception of reinforcement cannot
deal with one-trial operant phenom-
ena. If reinforcement depends on
discrimination, then the animal needs
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to experience at least two response-
outcome pairs in order to discrimi-
nate whether repetitions or variations
are being reinforced. To the extent
that a single food delivery can result
in reinforcement (Skinner, 1938,
p. 87), Neuringer’s account of the
latter seems incorrect. His account
may be salvaged by assuming two
kinds of reinforcement, one that
depends on discrimination and an-
other that does not. But the issue
then becomes to know how these two
kinds interact.
Second, Neuringer’s (1986) ac-
count of operant variability presup-
poses that animals can discriminate
whether repetitions or variations are
being reinforced. But what exactly is
being discriminated in, say, a Lag 25
contingency? That the current se-
quence differs from all 15 (say)
sequences emitted during the previ-
ous 25 trials or from only 10 of those
sequences? Is the discrimination
based on the entire sequence topog-
raphy or only some of its parts (e.g.,
beginning of sequence, relative num-
ber of left and right pecks, number of
switches and stays)? A discrimina-
tion-based account of operant vari-
ability will make different predictions
depending on the answers it gives to
these questions. But Neuringer’s ac-
count gives none. A fortiori, it fails to
explain how, concerning the discrim-
ination required to turn on and tune
the generator, a Lag 25 contingency
differs from a Lag 5 contingency.
Perhaps the reader will find it obvi-
ous that Neuringer’s view predicts
more variability under a lag of 25
than under a lag of 5. Our point is
that this is not obvious at all.
Third, the account suggests (prob-
ably metaphorically) that animals
‘‘turn on’’ a random generator when
they ‘‘discriminate’’ that reinforce-
ment follows diverse responses. But
consider a Lag 5 contingency. It
seems odd that an animal capable of
detecting that reinforcement follows
‘‘diverse responses’’ would generate
as many as 30 different sequences in a
50-trial session when only six se-
quences, cycled through systemat-
ically, would suffice to obtain all
available reinforcers (see Page &
Neuringer, 1985, Figure 6). Arguing
that memory limitations prevent the
animal from cycling through the six
sequences systematically is question-
able because the initial discrimination
implies no such limitations. More
generally, the account grants pigeons
significant memory powers to dis-
criminate a high level of sequence
variability (and tune the variability
generator accordingly), but then de-
nies them the same memory powers
to vary a few sequences systematical-
ly. The account is, if not contradic-
tory, at least implausible.
Looking for alternatives. Machado
(1989, 1992, 1993, 1997) has sketched
an alternative account, one that
attempts to fill the causal gap between
reinforcement (S) and response (R)
distributions without denying that
reinforcement strengthens the re-
sponses that produce it. The account
starts by examining the various pro-
cedures used to condition response
variability—procedures that reinforce
least recent responses, sequences with
higher recurrence times, novel re-
sponses, low-frequency sequences—
and identifies a common thread:
the presence of negative frequency-
dependent selection (Blough, 1966;
Shimp, 1967). More specifically, in all
cases, reinforcement is more likely to
follow the momentarily weakest ac-
tivities and, conversely, extinction is
more likely to follow the momentarily
strongest activities.
When the environment implements
negative frequency-dependent selec-
tion, the organism–environment in-
teraction is strongly dynamic: As a
response variant becomes weaker,
it is differentially reinforced, which
should strengthen it; but as a re-
sponse variant becomes stronger, it
is differentially extinguished, which
should weaken it. At equilibrium, all
variants are equally strong, and
response variability is substantial. In
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short, the combined effects of rein-
forcement and extinction, one strength-
ening the weakest responses and the
other weakening the strongest re-
sponses, are logically sufficient to
promote and maintain behavioral
variability.1 The various procedures
used to condition variability differ in
the proxy used to identify the mo-
mentary strength of the response
variants (e.g., recency, frequency,
novelty), how accurate that identifi-
cation is, and how selectively they
reinforce and extinguish the weak and
strong response variants, respectively.
To illustrate, consider the typical
lag procedure. All else being equal, a
sequence’s recurrence time varies
inversely with its strength; the lag
procedure implements negative fre-
quency-dependent selection. But to
promote variability, how high should
the lag parameter be—1, 5, 25, or 50,
for example? On the one hand, to
extinguish the momentarily strongest
sequences, the lag should be as large
as possible, because the larger the lag
the longer the extinction period. On
the other hand, to reinforce the
momentarily weakest sequences, the
lag should be as small as possible,
because the smaller the lag the longer
the reinforcement period. It follows
that the optimal lag value, that which
engenders the highest degree of var-
iability, is unlikely to be too small
(strong responses will not extinguish
sufficiently) or too large (weak re-
sponses will not be reinforced, and
responding itself will not be sustained
for lack of reinforcement). This
reasoning is consistent with Page
and Neuringer’s (1985) finding that
sequence variability increased from
Lag 5 to Lag 25 but decreased
slightly for Lag 50.
With pigeons producing eight-peck
sequences per trial, Page and Neur-
inger’s (1985) Lag 25 procedure may
have scored high on the two features
necessary to promote and sustain
behavioral variability: (a) how effec-
tively the schedule extinguishes the
momentarily stronger sequences (bi-
ases), and (b) how effectively the
schedule reinforces the momentarily
weaker responses. In contrast, the
yoke procedure scores low on both
features, because although it includes
the same periods of extinction and
reinforcement, those periods are not
selectively coupled with the strongest
and weakest sequences, respectively.
More specific predictions will need
to take into account how fast the
sequences lose and gain strength
when extinguished and reinforced,
respectively.
CONCLUSION
Barba calls our attention to a
major discrepancy in studies of oper-
ant variability, that between the
reinforcement criterion and the mea-
surement of its behavioral effects.
But we disagree with the reason
Barba invokes to lament the discrep-
ancy. Differentiation and discrimina-
tion are not primitive processes; they
derive from reinforcement, extinc-
tion, and generalization. The main
reason for lamenting the discrepancy
is that it reveals a major conceptual
gap in our account of operant vari-
ability, namely, how high degrees
of variability (e.g., measured by U
scores) result from the differential
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1 To ask how reinforcement can increase
behavioral variability is like asking how
natural selection can increase genetic variabil-
ity. Biologists have long recognized that when
the fitness of a phenotype depends inversely on
its frequency in the population (i.e., negative
frequency-dependent selection), genetic vari-
ability may be promoted and maintained. The
classic example is Fisher’s (1930) theoretical
account of the sex ratio, but Clark (1979) also
stressed the importance of frequency-depen-
dent selection to explain polymorphisms (be-
havioral and otherwise) in parasite–host and
predator–prey systems. For experimental stud-
ies of frequency-dependent selection, see Gi-
gord, Macnair, and Smithson (2001) as well as
Hori (1993). Machado, Keen, and Macaux
(2008) further explored the analogy between
reinforcement and natural selection to under-
stand the acquisition of preference in concur-
rent schedules.
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reinforcement of sequences with high
recurrence times. Neuringer’s (1986)
conception of operant variability suf-
fers from various limitations and is
unlikely to fill the gap. And we have
sketched an alternative, behavior-
analytic account that may be able
to close the gap: Reinforcement
may promote behavioral variability
through frequency-dependent selec-
tion.Whether this account is adequate
remains to be seen through further
empirical and theoretical analyses.
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